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School of Advanced International Studies for his master’s and then to Columbia for his Ph.D. in 
international politics.  He accompanied his advisor, Roger Hilsman, to Washington, D.C. to work 
on his unsuccessful congressional campaign in 1972.  Through friends, he was hired by Senator 
Muskie’s office to work as a legislative assistant from 1972 to 1975.  He later taught at Stanford 
and wrote a book on his experiences called The US Senate and Strategic Arms Policy.  He 
returned to D.C. a few years later as a political appointee in the Carter administration.  He 
worked in that administration until January 1980, soon after the Russians invaded Afghanistan, 
when he made the difficult decision to return to Stanford.  He then went from Stanford to the 
Rand Corporation, which moved to Washington.  He was still living and working in Washington, 
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Transcript 
 
Don Nicoll:   It is the 21st of June, 2001, we are at the Gibson, Dunn law firm at 1050 
Connecticut Avenue NW in Washington, D.C. interviewing Alan Platt, and Don Nicoll is the 
interviewer.  Alan, if you would state your full name, spell it, and give us your date and place of 
birth and the names of your parents. 
 
Alan Platt: Alan Arthur Platt, P-L-A-T-T.  I was born on August 14th, 1944 in Jamaica, New 
York.  My parents’ names were Philip and Ruth. 
 
DN:   And you grew up in Jamaica, or? 
 
AP:   I grew up on Long Island, not exactly where I was born but within a few miles. 
 
DN:   And attended schools there? 
 
AP:    I went to a private high school in that area.  When I went off to college, my parents moved 
and I haven’t really lived in that area since I was seventeen. 
 
DN:   Where did you go to college? 
 
AP:    I went to Princeton. 
 
DN:   And did you go to graduate school directly from college? 
 
AP:    I did, at Princeton I majored in international politics, and after Princeton I went to the 
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies where I got a master’s, and then I went 
on for a Ph.D. at Columbia in international politics. 
 
DN:   Were you pushed in that direction at all by your parents, or did they have any interest in 
international affairs? 
 
AP:    No, my parents thought, given my interest, I should go to law school.  But a combination 
of my professors in college, and work at the State Department for a summer, led me in that 
direction. 
 
DN:   And what was your particular topic, or your dissertation topic, for your Ph.D.? 
 
AP:    I wrote a doctoral dissertation on U.S. foreign policy toward Italy.  I had spent a year 
studying in Italy and it combined my interest in Italian politics with an interest in the American 
foreign policy process.  And I completed that at Columbia in the early seventies. 
 
DN:   And did you come directly from there to Ed Muskie, or? 
 AP:    No, I, what happened was that I was finishing my doctoral dissertation and my advisor, 
Roger Hilsman, who was a professor at Columbia who had served in the State Department 
during the Kennedy administration, asked me what I was going to do when I finished my 
dissertation. And I said, “Well, I was thinking of moving to Washington to seek a job in the 
Congress.”  And he said, “I’m going to run for Congress next year.”  To make a long story short, 
I moved to Hilsman’s house in eastern Connecticut and lived with him for a year and had my 
first experience in electoral politics.  I started off as a speechwriter and campaign aide, and 
ended up as the campaign manager.  Unfortunately he lost in 1972, as did all challenging 
Democrats in a bad year for Democrats. 
 
Ironically, Hilsman decided to run for Congress, his only time to run for elective office, because 
in early 1972 he thought that Ed Muskie was likely to be the Democratic candidate for president 
and whether Muskie was successful or not for president, Hilsman was confident that Muskie 
would run very well in eastern Connecticut and that he might end up being swept in with Muskie 
if Muskie were on the top of the ticket.  In that part of Connecticut there are a lot of Polish 
Americans, a lot of people of eastern European ethnic background, and I think it would have 
been a good area for Muskie.  It was not a great area for George McGovern, and ultimately 
Hilsman lost. 
 
DN:   And what happened to you after the campaign? 
 
AP:    Well, I had been bitten by the political bug and moved to Washington and began calling 
friends with the idea of getting a job on Capitol Hill.  And as it happened, two of my friends 
from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies were working for Ed Muskie: 
Maynard Toll and Charlie Micoleau.  And Maynard Toll, who I knew reasonably well, explained 
that he was going to be changing his position in Muskie’s office from legislative assistant to 
administrative assistant and that his former job was open.  And I went up for an interview and 
met with Maynard, and met with the senator, and ultimately was offered a job and accepted the 
job before the end of 1972. 
 
DN:   So you were, and you became a legislative assistant with a focus on international affairs. 
 
AP:    And defense policy. 
 
DN:   And how long were you with Senator Muskie in the office? 
 
AP:    I began in late 1972 and left in the spring of 1975.  Muskie had gone on the Senate 
Foreign Relations committee, I believe in 1970.  I was told it was perhaps with an eye toward 
running for president that he wanted to have this sort of experience, but had not spent a lot of 
time on the committee because in fact he was out campaigning.  So when I arrived, he was going 
to be a member of the Senate Foreign Relations committee, which he was for the period I was 
there. But in late ‘74 the Senate Budget committee legislation was enacted and in 1975 he 
became the first chairman of the Senate Budget committee and had to give up his membership on 
Foreign Relations, and my job in Muskie’s office became of less interest than it had been in the 
previous years because he was not on the Foreign Relations committee. 
 DN:   And where did you go from there? 
 
AP:    When I left Muskie’s office I went out to Stanford, wrote a book on my experiences called 
The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy.Taught at Stanford, wrote this book, and ultimately 
came back to Washington a few years later as a political appointee in the Carter administration 
working at the Arms Control Agency on many of the issues I’d worked on on Capitol Hill and 
written about in this book. 
 
DN:   So your focus became more and more international arms control policy? 
 
AP:    Well, it’s a funny story.  When I was hired by Muskie, we talked about what I would work 
on. I was a European specialist, having spent some time living in Italy, having written a doctoral 
dissertation on that subject and written some other things on it, and Muskie was the chairman of 
the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Europe.  When the new Congress got put together in 
early 1975, the subcommittees were rejiggered and Muskie was given Subcommittee on Arms 
Control. 
 
DN:   That wouldn’t have been ‘75, it was ‘73. 
 
AP:    Did I say, ‘73, excuse me. 
 
DN: Okay, yeah. 
 
 AP: When the new committees were formed in the Congress beginning in 1973 he was given 
the Subcommittee on Arms Control and I had already been offered the position.  And we had a 
discussion about it and I said, “Frankly, senator, I don’t know anything about arms control.” And 
he said, “I don’t either, we’ll learn together.”  So for the next session of the Congress we spent a 
lot of time together on issues related to arms control and disarmament, held a series of hearings, 
and did a variety of other things, and we did both learn together.  And frankly, it had an 
important impact on the rest of my career because after having worked on these issues, as 
compared to having specialized, say, on Europe, I ended up writing a book in this area. And 
when the Carter administration was elected, the kind of positions that were open to me were 
determined by what I had worked on and what I was strongest on, and at that point I had become 
something of a specialist. And it was not surprising that I ended up working at the Arms Control 
Agency and have spent work in this area for my entire career as a result of my working for 
Muskie on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control. 
 
DN:   What was it like learning this intricate subject with Ed Muskie? 
 
AP:    Well, it was a challenge.  It was a challenge for both of us.  He obviously was a very 
capable intellect who didn’t have a lot of experience in this area, but soaked up material 
extremely well, always asked the next question beyond what you thought you knew, was 
formidable preparing for hearings.  This was the period in which Henry Kissinger first was 
National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State. We had many meetings with Henry 
Kissinger where I had to prepare Muskie for the meeting, and he always wanted to be at least as 
prepared if not more so than any person I’ve ever met.  So it was a real challenge! 
 
DN:   What, what were the major questions that you were dealing with in that ‘73-‘74 period? 
 
AP:    I’ve talked about arms control, and some of the issues did relate to arms control. Both 
strategical armament limitation talks were going on, and also talks on mutual balance force 
reductions as well as other arms control subjects and we held hearings on virtually all of them. 
And Muskie became quite knowledgeable on many of these issues.  In addition to that, I was 
broadly his assistant dealing with all foreign policy issues as well as defense issues other than 
arms control. 
 
In terms of other foreign policy issues, he had an interest coming out of the 1972 campaign in 
things related to the Middle East and Israel. He spent a lot of time on that; things related to 
Russia, we spent time on that.  He was heavily involved in the Jackson-Vannick amendment to 
the Trade Bill that had to do with immigration from Russia and he had been one of the original 
sponsors with Scoop Jackson in the early seventies and was very active throughout my period 
with him on these issues. 
 
Another issue that came up was the War Powers Act, and that was an interesting situation.  That 
happened to be a subject that he had not spent much time on. But when the War Powers 
legislation came up, and of course the Vietnam War was still going on, the Nixon administration 
was opposed to this. And there were various differences within the Foreign Relations Committee 
and on the floor as to whether this was wise or not, the leadership turned to Muskie to be the 
floor leader.  And this was a subject that was fairly complicated, it was clearly very important, 
and not a subject that he had spent a lot of time on.  And ultimately after thinking about it and 
talking about it, he agreed to be the floor leader and mastered the subject, and along with Senator 
Javits and some others, Javits being the Republican leader, the legislation ultimately was passed. 
 But it was really a testament to Muskie and his intellectual capabilities that they turned to him 
with relatively short notice, and he was able to carry this forward. 
 
DN:   How did he prepare himself?  You’ve talked about him absorbing material, but how did he 
prepare himself in terms of the, his colleagues in the Senate, for example, and how they might 
respond? 
 
AP:    Well, in this one he was like getting on a moving train.  Many of his colleagues had a lot 
more history than he did on this subject. So he talked to the people in the leadership and got 
some sense of where this train was going and how, as the conductor, he could lead it in a way 
that was going to be successful.  As he did with everything, he immersed himself in the 
substantive material at great length. And he provided a certain kind of intellectual direction and 
force. And I say, unlike some other issues, on this one a lot of the kind of the political deals had 
been worked out by the time he got involved. 
 
One issue that we mentioned in the defense area that I think is an interesting one, and I spent 
some time on this when I worked for Muskie and then ended up writing about it in this book that 
I wrote on my experiences in the Senate, was in the defense area.  And there was a great debate 
in the 1973-74 period, when Jim Schlesinger was the secretary of defense, about changing our 
targeting doctrine.  It was a fairly arcane subject in terms of military strategy, but we held a 
series of hearings through the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Arms Control on this 
and had people in of all different persuasions. And Muskie had become quite an expert, having 
soaked up a lot of information in a series of hearings and he understood it was quite an important 
subject.  And he came to believe that the Nixon administration was headed in the wrong 
direction in terms of what they wanted to do in this area.  And in 1974 a bill came out of the 
Armed Services Committee that committed a lot of money to carry forward this Nixon initiative, 
which was very divisive and clearly controversial.  And the question became, would Muskie 
offer an amendment on the floor to change the direction and the funding for this counter force 
targeting. 
 
DN:   What was the Nixon policy or approach in brief? 
 
AP:    In brief, there was an effort that Schlesinger led, that Nixon supported, that Kissinger 
supported, to change our targeting doctrine to make it more precise.  We had had a targeting 
doctrine that basically consisted of mutual assured destruction doctrine: as a way of deterring the 
Russians we would have several thousand warheads, and in the event there was attack on us they 
were led to believe we would respond, and that solidified our deterrence.  There was a sense in 
the Nixon administration that we had to refine this doctrine, that we had to begin having, and 
being able to convey to the Russians a much more precise targeting doctrine so that they 
understood that, in fact, if they were to attack a city, we would attack a city, or if they were to 
attack a silo, we would attack a silo.  And that there was a belief that the deterrent value of just 
saying we’d respond massively was decreasing. 
 
Obviously this point of view has a certain amount of plausibility. But Muskie argued that to 
drive our targeting doctrine into a very specific direction was not necessary and would likely 
lead to counter reaction by the Soviets in a way that would be destabilizing for both sides.  And, 
you know, I can go into more detail, but it was a fairly arcane military argument.  And the 
question was, would he offer an amendment on the floor to set this right and to kind of create a 
bipartisan consensus around what had been a targeting doctrine for many years. 
 
And I spent a number of hours with him trying to persuade him to do this, and one of the very 
few disappointments I had working for Ed Muskie is that he refused.  And he said, “I will 
support it, I will speak out, but I will not offer the amendment.”  And I said that I thought if it 
was not him offering the amendment, the chance of this amendment succeeding were very slim, 
that he had a certain amount of bipartisan credibility, he had held all these hearings on the 
subject, and that he should be the leader of it.  And at the end of the day, he did not want to take 
on Scoop Jackson and John Tower on this technical subject, on the Senate floor.  He did not feel 
comfortable doing that, did not offer the amendment, Senator McIntyre of New Hampshire 
offered the amendment, and the amendment failed. 
 
DN:   Who was Senator McIntyre’s assistant, who was the specialist at that time? 
 
AP:    Larry Smith was his assistant. 
 
DN:   This, and it was the issue of feared lack of credibility that - 
 AP:    It actually is an interesting question of what motivated Muskie to not do this. And I 
always thought it was a combination both of his personal style, and he didn’t like to get involved 
in things where he didn’t feel a hundred percent comfortable in what he was doing, especially in 
a situation where he was going to be taking on two of the more formidable senators on a subject 
they had spent their entire careers on, which he had not.  And the structural issue was, it’s very 
hard (and it certainly was even harder twenty-five years ago), to get senators on the Foreign 
Relations Committee to challenge members of the Armed Services Committee on armed services 
issues.  There’s a quality to military issues that insulates those issues from the kind of broad 
debate you get in the Senate on most other issues.  So it was a combination of things. 
 
DN:   Were there any potential allies on the Armed Services Committee at that time? 
 
AP:    Absolutely, Senator McIntyre was on the Armed Services, there were a number of allies 
on Armed Services. It was a close vote on this within the committee.  But - 
 
DN:   No one else, no one beyond Tom McIntyre was willing to take it on. 
 
AP:    Oh, there were others.  There was group of staffers with some of the senators got together 
and tried to figure out if Muskie was not available, who would be the best person who knew the 
issue, and we agreed it was McIntyre.  But, no, there were a lot of other senators on both sides of 
the aisle who were interested. 
 
DN:   Was Senator Brooke involved in that at that time? 
 
AP:    Senator Brooke was heavily involved; he voted for the McIntyre amendment. 
 
DN:   Were there other, well at this time you were dealing with the winding down of the 
Vietnam War, and Kissinger’s policies there, and Nixon’s.  How deeply involved did Senator 
Muskie get in that issue at that stage of the game? 
 
AP:    It was a complicated issue for him because it turned out of course as we learned more as 
the years went on about dirty tricks where his name came up. He was a little reluctant to get 
directly involved because he clearly had been involved at first hand.  At the end of the day he 
inevitably was involved because, as you may recall, there were allegations that Henry Kissinger 
had been involved in wiretapping.  And they decided to create special subcommittee in the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to examine Henry Kissinger’s role in wiretapping. 
Fulbright was the chairman, and Fulbright asked Muskie to chair this.  And Muskie understood 
that it was an important assignment and he was being looked to once again for leadership on an 
issue of national importance, and he accepted the assignment.  Actually we held a series of 
hearings in the Muskie subcommittee on this subject individually.  And we also held a series of 
hearings with Sam Ervin, who was chairing another subcommittee at the time in addition to the 
Watergate committee on Constitutional rights. 
 
One interesting aspect of this, which is, best I know has not been recorded anywhere else, had to 
do with this Muskie subcommittee investigation of Kissinger’s role in wiretapping. Muskie and I 
had talked about him doing this, and I didn’t think he had much choice and he ultimately agreed 
with that. This was not something he enthusiastically jumped into but realized that he had, that it 
was important and he needed to do this. And he said, “You’re going to be my staff person.”  And 
I said that I did not have any background regarding wire tapping, and that he really needed some 
people who had legal training, that this was going to be a serious exercise and he needed to make 
sure that it was going to be a credible exercise.  And he went to see Senator Fulbright, and this is 
at least my own recollection of the way this played out, and Fulbright refused him monies to hire 
new staff. 
 
And I always believe that at the end of the day, Fulbright was not interested in having an 
exhaustive investigation of Henry Kissinger’s role in wiretapping.  Fulbright and Kissinger 
during that period had created a good personal relationship. I think there was a widespread 
perception on Capitol Hill in this period that was moving toward Nixon stepping down, that 
Kissinger was a very important pillar in the government and in America’s role in the world. And 
people were very reluctant to do anything that was going to undercut the strength of Kissinger 
and U.S. security as a result of that.  In any case, for whatever reason, Fulbright refused our 
efforts to get additional money for staff.  He did agree to make available one person from full 
committee staff to work on this, somebody by the name of Norville Jones. 
 
DN:   Is he an attorney? 
 
AP:    I think he in fact had gone to law school.  He would have been the first to say he was not 
experienced in wire tapping, but he was a very bright guy and he took this seriously, and he was 
full time working with Muskie and I was helping him as best I could on this whole investigation. 
 So to the extent he was involved in this, there was a series of hearings that he had that all 
revolved around Kissinger and his role in wire tapping that he directly chaired. 
 
DN:   How did the Muskie relationship with Kissinger evolve while you were with him? 
 
AP:    They had very good relations.  The fact is that Kissinger would come to see him, and I sat 
in on a number of meetings where there were three people in the room, Kissinger, Muskie and 
myself.  Kissinger came with no staff most of the time. And Kissinger would frequently say to 
Muskie, “I have great respect for you, Senator Muskie, you’re one of the few members of the 
committee who can really understand the complexities of world politics.”  He would then explain 
his point of view, Muskie would ask him questions, and frequently they saw eye to eye, and I 
think Muskie was a great admirer of Kissinger’s. 
 
DN:   Who were some of the other figures at that time in the, either the foreign policy 
establishment or in the Senate on whom he depended for advice and counsel? 
 
AP:    Well, when I arrived in Muskie’s office in late 1972, he had just gone through the 
campaign. And during the campaign Tony Lake had been full time foreign policy advisor, and 
Maynard Toll had been on the staff working on foreign policy. And the two key people outside 
the office and the campaign who he relied on heavily were Cy Vance and Paul Warnke.  So 
certainly for much of 1973 when anything came up, and some issues came up that had 
antecedents during the campaign and I was not familiar with what positions he’d taken, or 
Maynard couldn’t remember some of the details, or they were complicated issues, he would say, 
“Get Cy on the phone, or get Paul on the phone.”  Those were the two people who he most 
heavily depended on in, say 1973, for foreign policy issues. 
 
DN:   And in the Senate, with whom did he tend to counsel on foreign policy issues? 
 
AP:    I would say the person he worked the most closely with was Hubert Humphrey.  They sat 
next to each other on the Foreign Relations Committee, and obviously had formed a relationship 
over many years.  That was the person with whom he exchanged views regularly on foreign 
policy.  He also had a good relationship with Javits who he’d talk to regularly, and a variety of 
others, but I think Humphrey and Javits are the two who I remember most. 
 
DN:   You mentioned one issue on which you and he in essence disagreed, that is taking on the 
targeted doctrine.  Were there others? 
 
AP:    Well, to clarify on the targeting doctrine issue we really, he ultimately voted for the 
McIntyre amendment and spoke out on the floor, he just didn’t want to be the floor leader on 
that.  So - 
 
DN:   You disagreed with him on the tactics. 
 
AP:    On the tactics.  I can honestly say, in all the period I worked with him, and we had many, 
many issues and many, many votes, there’s only one issue I can remember, and a relatively 
minor one, that I ever disagreed with him on.  I frequently had to brief him before there was a 
floor vote and his style was such that after he questioned you from all different sides, you 
frequently did not know how he was going to vote. But at the end of the day when he cast his 
vote I found myself agreeing with him ninety-nine and a half percent of the time. 
 
The one issue that I remember we had kind of an ongoing battle about concerned the future of 
the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.  This is an organization funded with federal money 
that is designed to help American companies be competitive in the international environment.  
The Japanese, the Europeans all have their form of OPIC, and in 1973-74 Muskie sat on the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multi-national Corporations. And the future of OPIC 
came up in that subcommittee and we had a series of hearings, and Frank Church was the 
chairman of that subcommittee.  As I recall, the members were Church, Symington, Muskie on 
the Democratic side, and Javits and Percy on the Republican side.  And there was a move by 
Church to zero the funding on this, saying that it was basically not very effective and was an 
organization that only helped big corporations that didn’t need the help anyway. 
 
At the end of the day, I thought Muskie should vote for the continuation of OPIC and he voted to 
kill it. And the vote in the subcommittee with three Democrats voted for it, voted for the Church 
position, two Republicans voted on the other side.  It got to the full committee and the floor, 
survived, and survives to this day, and I would argue continues to be a useful adjunct in this era 
as well. And indeed the Bush administration is trying to cut its budget by a third.  It’s now 
funded roughly in the seven hundred million dollar a year range, and helps promote American 
exports.  But we had some long debates about OPIC in which we disagreed, but that was really 
the only issue I can remember. 
 
DN:   Did he ever change his mind? 
 
AP:    He was able, yes.  I mean, not on OPIC he didn’t, but on other issues, you had to be very 
well prepared and forceful and articulate and persistent, but you could get him to change his 
mind.  I think as a result of hearings, he just soaked in material, and heard different points of 
view, and could easily come up with a view other than what he had before that.  Perhaps not 
quickly, but over time he certainly did change his mind. 
 
DN:   Before we leave this part of the interview, I wanted to ask you for the title of your book, 
we should have that in here for - 
 
AP:    The U.S. Senate and Strategic Arms Policy. 
 
DN:   It was published in - 
 
AP:    Westview Press. 
 
DN:   Okay. 
 
AP:    And also I should add, at the same time I did an edited volume called Congress and Arms 
Control, also published by Westview Press. 
 
DN:   You went from the Senate to Stanford, and then you came back in the Carter 
administration and were in the Arms Control Agency.  You were there for the entire Carter 
administration? 
 
AP:    No, I resigned soon after the Russians invaded Afghanistan in January 1980, when arms 
control was not very interesting.  I had been involved in a series of negotiations with the 
Russians, all which stopped, and it was clear that this was not going to be an area that either 
made sense or was productive. And I began to think about what I wanted to do next, and realized 
what I wanted to do next was to go back to California and go back to Stanford, and worked out 
an arrangement to do that. 
 
Soon after I had told my colleagues at the Arms Control Agency, which is a semi-autonomous 
part of the State Department, that I was planning to leave later in the spring to return to Stanford, 
we had the situation with the Iran hostage effort that was unsuccessful. Cy Vance resigned as 
Secretary of State and Ed Muskie was named.  And the question I was presented with was do I 
go back to Stanford or think about staying around with Ed Muskie as a Secretary of State.  The 
timing was not great in the sense that I had already committed to moving back to California. But 
I held open the possibility of working for Muskie, who I very much liked and respected and 
thought he would be an excellent Secretary of State. 
 
To help me with my thinking on this, I got together with a few friends who were likely to be 
involved with Muskie, including Leon Billings and Bob Rose, Madeleine Albright, Maynard 
Toll, Doug Bennett, and I talked to all of them about the situation and what they were going to 
do.  It became clear early on that Leon and Bob and Leslie Finn, who was the office manager, 
were going to move down to the State Department, [and] Carole Parmelee, with Muskie. And 
Madeleine and Doug Bennett had, as I recall, made it clear that if Muskie wanted them to work 
at the State Department they would be delighted to. But that the general sense was that that 
would make sense not in the last part of the first Carter administration but if Carter were 
reelected and Muskie were to continue as Secretary of State, that would be the time to bring in 
his own team, as compared to replacing a lot of people who were there. 
 
So I decided to move to California and see what happened in the 1980 election.  There was also, 
I should add, some question in my mind that had Carter won, whether Muskie would have been 
asked to continue as Secretary of State in a second Carter term.  Muskie and Brzezinski did not 
have good relations, Carter was very close to Brzezinski, and I don’t know how that would have 
played out.  So I decided that for a variety of reasons it made sense to go back to Stanford and 
that’s what I did. 
 
DN:   It’s your impression that even after the fiasco with the attempt to rescue the hostages that 
Brzezinski’s cache with the president remained? 
 
AP:    Yes, and that was not seen as his fault. 
 
DN:   Did you have any observations on Secretary Muskie’s performance in that role? 
 
AP:    Well, I obviously observed with great interest, having worked closely with him on a 
number of these issues. I was living in California during the spring, summer, fall of 1980, and I 
was on the phone with Leon and Bob at various times. Things came up and they called me and I 
called them.  I actually had some advice that I believe was largely disregarded during that period. 
 I have the impression that Muskie felt very strongly that it was his job to essentially not break a 
lot of new ground, nor break much china during that period, and that the time for new initiatives 
would be in 1981 if Carter got reelected.  And he chose by and large to basically continue what 
had been going on, and on various issues to try to avoid at all costs inter-agency differences. 
 
And I suspect that a lot of these came up and he made an effort to try to be as conciliatory as 
possible, particularly with Brzezinski at the NSC, but I’m sure there were some differences 
between State and Defense. I wasn’t sure that that was the right strategy at the time, and then 
frankly after Carter lost and I learned through friends that Brzezinski was going to be writing a 
book about the Carter administration, I urged Muskie through Leon and Bob to write a book to 
make sure that his point of view on some of these things was accurately reflected, and Muskie 
refused.  And that didn’t surprise me, given what had happened in the last part of 1980. 
 
DN:   After he left the State Department, did you ever have a chance to talk to him about that 
experience? 
 
AP:    About the State experience? 
 
DN:   Yeah. 
 AP:    Some, I did see him some through the years.  I was in California.  I moved back to 
Washington in 1984. Ultimately I moved from Stanford to the Rand Corporation, and then 
moved with the Rand Corporation from the think tank based in Santa Monica, from Santa 
Monica back to their Washington office, and I saw Muskie at various times.  Indeed, I was 
involved with him some in 1987 when he was appointed to the Tower Commission, my advice 
was solicited on some issues related to that. So I had contact with him, and also we saw each 
other socially at various events.  I never had a detailed conversation with him about any of the 
specifics of what he might or might not have done as Secretary of State.  At that point I felt - 
 
DN:   Did he reflect at all on the experience? 
 
AP:    I mean it’s actually quite interesting in light of the conversation we had earlier about his 
not having served for a long time on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and to some 
extent feeling he was a novice and uneasy with some of these issues.  I think he thought 
Secretary of State was an enormous challenge, and I think he responded to it very positively and 
my sense is that he never regretted for a day doing that. 
 
DN:   As you look back on your time in the Senate working for him, what strikes you most about 
him and his approach to the foreign policy field and the arms issues, and what strikes you most 
about the way the office functioned while you were there? 
 
AP:    Well, the Muskie story is a good microcosm of how the Senate’s changed in twenty-five 
years.  In my current capacity I get up to Capitol Hill from time to time.  As we move into the 
21st century the Senate is very partisan, it’s very polarized.  You don’t have a lot of the 
camaraderie and the friendships as existed twenty-five years ago.  Twenty-five years ago, when 
there were sessions late at night, Muskie had a hideaway at the Capitol.  He had a variety of 
friends on both sides of the aisle who he felt comfortable with personally, and he was a guy that 
sought compromise.  And whether we’re talking about the War Powers Act, or we’re talking 
about a whole host of legislation, he was a great one at bringing people together and people came 
together because typically they respected him and they respected his intellect, and especially on 
issues that they didn’t know as much as he did, they would defer to his judgment.  And that 
certainly came up in the environmental area and other areas.  So in the environment in which he 
operated, and to some extent which he epitomized, and he could carry lots of people with him on 
a certain vote, which doesn’t exist today by and large.  It’s a different world on the Hill. 
 
As far as the office goes, a number of the people I’ve stayed friendly with over the years, which 
may be unusual for some offices.  I think today people come and go in congressional offices, and 
they don’t develop the kind of ties that we developed in those years.  And it became something 
of a family to people.  I should say that I was one of the few people on the staff who was not 
married at the time. I got married in the early eighties, so I spent actually a lot of time in the 
office and I was the designated person to travel with Ed Muskie.  And we spent large numbers of 
hours traveling because in 1972 a number of senators had campaigned for president for him, and 
owed a number of political IOUs. So, for example, I can remember going out to Kansas a 
number of occasions for Bill Roy who was running against Bob Dole in a very dirty campaign, 
Adlai Stevenson in Illinois and a variety of other places.  And I used to travel with him, and he 
was sometimes a difficult person to travel with - 
 
DN:   Why was he difficult to travel with? 
 
AP:    Well, he’s one of those people when if the plane is delayed or your bag is lost, he’s not 
very patient.  And I would come back and delight the office with stories of traveling with Ed 
Muskie on a particular trip.   And I would keep it within the staff however. 
 
DN:   The total experience with Ed Muskie left you with what assessment of his particular 
qualities and complexities? 
 
AP:    I’m a big fan of Ed Muskie’s.  He had an enormous amount of integrity, obviously a 
quality that’s not always present in American politics today.  He was a towering intellect, he was 
a guy that you never for a minute hesitated to say you work for him, he would always make you 
proud.  The thing that I was struck, though, and I entered this after he had run unsuccessfully for 
president, is how apolitical he was.  I’ll never forget one of the first trips I took with him, we 
were on a plane going up to New York in perhaps January of 1973, and we were reading the New 
York Times and he looked over to me and he said, “Is there a mayoralty race in New York?”  
And I had to explain to him that John Lindsay was running in a tough reelection campaign. And I 
was thinking to myself, this is the guy who ran for president, and he’s not aware of the fact 
there’s a mayoralty race in New York?  And I subsequently learned as I got to know him more, 
he had been in Florida and opposed the space shuttle. He was not a guy who followed petty 
partisan politics, it was just not part of his make up and it perhaps at times hurt him because he 
was not focused more on the political aspects of things.  But that was him, and that was his style. 
 
DN:   Thank you very much, Alan. 
 
AP:    You’re welcome. 
 
End of Interview 
